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We identify two major changes in the dynamics of the federal funds rate in the 1990s.  We 
model the desired rate in a two-regime setting, one when the Fed makes no change and the 
other when the Fed is moving the desired rate to a new level. We find that the 1990s saw 
longer duration in the no-change regime as well as smaller changes in the other regime. The 
smaller changes were neither due to a less aggressive Fed nor due to lower volatility of the 
fundamentals. In fact, the Fed responded more aggressively to changes in fundamentals in 
the 1990s.  
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Movements in the monthly federal funds rate were remarkably smoother in the 
1990s than in the preceding decade. This is visually apparent in Figure 1, which plots the 
monthly differences in the federal funds rate. The standard deviation of the first difference 
falls in half, from 0.331 in the 80s to 0.165 in the 90s. We use an unobserved components 
model to separate the desired component of the federal funds rate from noise. We then 
investigate the major elements that account for the increased smoothness of the funds rate.  
While the federal funds rate, it, is directly observable, the desired funds rate, i , is 
not. We infer values of i  by building a two-part model. First, we decompose the funds rate 
into two components, a desired funds rate and a white noise term. This decomposition 
assumes that any persistence in the funds rate must be desired. Next, we assume there are 
some periods in which the Fed keeps the desired rate unchanged. We use a first-order 







 is in this static regime. In other 
periods, the change in the desired rate is hit by an unobserved serially correlated shock. 
Thus the desired rate process obeys a nonlinear mixture model, mixing a stationary and a 
nonstationary process. 
Next, we allow for partial observability of the desired funds rate by allowing 
fundamental economic pressures in the economy to affect the changes in the desired rate 
along with the shocks. This “partially observed” model provides for structural inferences 
about the changes in the conduct of in monetary policy in the 1990s. We allow for the 
fundamental pressures in two ways; the first is an estimated monetary policy rule with 
  2forward-looking components. In the second, we include Taylor’s rule with its original 
weights on inflation and output gap.  
We present several new results in the paper. We show the amount of noise present 
in the actual funds rate is quite small relative to the desired rate and the fall in the variance 
came mostly from the desired rate. Probing deeper, our results show that the probability of 
being in the static-desired-rate regime increased significantly in the 1990s. Moreover, the 
variance of the first difference of the desired rate in the non-static regime also dropped 
considerably. This means that the desired rate was less likely to change in the 1990s and 
that when it did change the average size of those changes was smaller. Further 
investigations using fundamental pressures rule out either a less aggressive behavior of the 
Fed in the 1990s or lower volatility of the fundamentals as explanations of the lower 
variance of first difference in the desired rate. In fact, the evidence points to the contrary, 
the Fed became more aggressive, especially with respect to forward-looking variables. 
This paper also contributes to the estimation process of the monetary policy reaction 
function literature. We introduce a modeling technique that considers the non-linearities 
while estimating the coefficients of the reaction function. In our model, the coefficients are 
interpreted as the response of the desired rate to a unit change in the fundamentals when the 
desired rate did respond.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: We briefly review some of the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature in section 2. In section 3, we lay out our main model to estimate 
and all the variations in it that we will use for further structural analysis. In section 4, we 
present the key empirical results as well as the additional structural results. We summarize 
and conclude in section 5 
  3.2. The Background: Theoretical and Empirical 
A key feature of the 1990s was, as Mankiw  points out (Mankiw, 2002), the 
remarkable stability of both real and nominal variables. The federal funds rate, the most 
important indicator of monetary policy in the last two decades, itself became far more 
stable. A number of authors have investigated the smoother dynamics of the funds rate. 
 The primary explanation in the literature for smooth dynamics of the federal funds 
rate is that the actual rate adjusts only partially to the desired rate. This phenomenon is 
generally labeled as ‘inertia’. According to Rudebusch  “The Federal Reserve as well as the 
financial press appears to interpret the purpose of such smoothing to be the avoidance of 
‘undue stress’ on financial markets” (Rudebusch, 1995). Woodford  argues (Woodford, 
1999) that in the presence of forward-looking private agents, inertial behavior may be 
optimal for the central banker with a goal of output gap and inflation stabilization. It acts as 
a commitment device against frequent reversals in the desired rate changes. 
Empirical evidence on inertial behavior in the federal funds rate is very robust 
across different studies. Studies based on quarterly data typically report an estimate of 
inertia in the range of 50-80 percent
1. The monthly study by Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
reports inertial estimates of over 90 percent for the US (Clarida et al., 1998). At a higher 
frequency level, Rudebusch provides evidence of significant partial adjustment in the funds 
rate on a daily basis (Rudebusch, 1995). All of these high values of inertia imply a high 
degree of persistence in the federal funds rate dynamics. Using a longer time series, Watson 
also found a very high degree of persistence in the funds rate process (Watson, 1999). 
                                                 
1 For example, see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (Clarida et al., 2000), Judd and Rudebusch (Judd and Rudebusch, 
1998). 
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consistent across different samples and frequencies. 
The second explanation for smooth dynamics of the federal funds rate can be traced 
back to Brainard (Brainard, 1967). He argued that in the presence of significant 
multiplicative parametric uncertainty, the monetary authority should respond in a highly 
cautious fashion to changes in the macroeconomic fundamentals. This results in sluggish 
movements in the desired rate itself rather than sluggish adjustments towards a desired rate. 
Sack provides some support in favor of this hypothesis as an explanation of smoothness in 
the federal funds rate (Sack, 2000). He used the variance-covariance matrix of estimated 
parameters as a measure of parametric uncertainty to show multiplicative parametric 
uncertainty results in significantly reduced volatility of the desired rates. Sack and Wieland 
provides (Sack and Wieland, 1999) a good summary of the empirical evidence on interest 
rate smoothing. 
The above literature investigates linear models of persistence. However, a salient 
feature of monetary policy is that in many periods the Open Market Committee explicitly 
holds constant the target funds rate. In addition, there is an important technical issue about 
the degree of persistence of the shocks to the funds rate, i.e., is the federal funds rate 
process stationary but very persistent or is it non-stationary? An overwhelming majority of 
the literature fails to reject a unit root. However, in practice, both stationary processes and 
non-stationary processes are used for empirical modeling of the federal funds rate
2. The 
Markov-switching model we introduce in the next section directly models the ‘sometimes 
                                                 
2 For example, see Watson (Watson, 1999) and Mehra (Mehra, 1998). 
  5constant’ behavior of the Open Market Committee by allowing for periods of both 
stationary and non-stationary behavior of the actual federal funds rate. 
3. The Models 
3.1 The basic unobserved desired rate model 
Our model decomposes the actual federal funds rate into two components, a 
persistent desired rate part and a white noise component. The ‘white’ part of noise implies 
that the Fed does not make any persistent mistake in hitting its desired rate. Our 
measurement equation is: 
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We assume the desired rate evolves according to one of the two regimes. In the first 




− = t t i i                           (2)  
This specification implies that the actual federal funds rate is stationary in this regime in the 
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The change in the desired rate is hit by a serially correlated shock, u , assumed to follow an 
AR (1) process
t
3. We assume  1 < φ  and  . We call this the ‘dynamic’ regime.  ) , 0 ( ~
2
ν σ ν N t
                                                 
3 Several diagnostic checks suggest an AR (1) specification is sufficient. 
  6Letting    when the static model applies and S 0     St =   1     t =  when the desired funds 
rate is hit by the correlated shock, the two regimes can be nested in our basic non-linear 
model for the federal funds rate: 
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We assume that   follows a first order Markov process. Specifically, the transition 
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In the empirical implementation, we let every parameter of the model take on different 
values in the early and late periods.  
 
3.2 The models with fundamental economic pressures 
Both the level and the change in the desired funds rate are treated as unobserved in 
the above model. This eliminates the need to make an assumption about the Fed’s 
stabilization goals, but at the cost of discarding potential valuable information available 
from those variables. In this section, we modify the above model in the dynamic regime to 
allow for change in the desired rate to be partially observable and driven by changes in - the 
indicators containing information about the Fed's stabilization goals.  
  7In our first variant, we assume the first difference in the desired rate is driven by 
changes in components of a monetary policy rule with both forward-looking and backward 
looking features: 
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As in the previous model, we allow the changes in the desired rate to be hit by an 
unobserved AR (1) shock,  , which makes the changes in the desired rate only partially 
observed. The terms   indicate first differences in the variable concerned. The variable 
t u
(.) ∆
π  denotes inflation rate,   stands for expected inflation, 
e π x is the output gap and R  
represents the financial market spread that predicts future recessions and inflations
4. We 
assume these variables give information about the current and future output gaps and 
inflation conditions and therefore changes in these variables should influence Fed’s 
decision about changing the desired rate. We specify lagged changes to insure that the 
driving variables are in fact in the Fed’s information set. Our estimating model after 
allowing the parameters to change is given by: 
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It is useful to separate the relative reliance the Fed places on current versus forward-
looking indicators. Because the independent variables in Model 2 are lagged, there is a 
  8possibility that the forward-looking components are proxying for omitted information about 
the economic condition of the current period as well as future periods. To control for this 
possible effect, we substitute for the current period variables a target rate computed from 
Taylor’s rule using Taylor’s original weights (Taylor, 1993) on inflation and output gap and 
a real interest rate target of 2 percent
5. We restrict the changes in the desired rate to be the 
sum of the changes in the Taylor rule’s target rate, the effect of changes in the lagged 
forward looking variables and an AR (1) shock. If the target rates computed from Taylor’s 
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After allowing all the parameters to change values from 1991:04, our complete 
model can be written as: 
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Note that instead of estimating the coefficient of  , we restrict it to one.  This has the 
implication that monetary authority knows the current economic condition and acts fully 
according to the weights of Taylor’s rule. Therefore, the effect of lagged changes in the 
forward-looking variables will capture only additional forward-looking concerns of Fed 
T
t i ∆
                                                                                                                                                     
4 See Mishkin (Mishkin, 1990) and Estrella & Hardouvelis (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991) for discussions 
on these issues. 
  9while setting the desired rate. This experiment allows us to distinguish between the current 
period forecast component of the forward-looking variables as against their forecast of the 
future. This does have the drawback of forcing the weights Fed would assign on current 
inflation and output gap, but that is necessary to avoid the endogeneity issue involved to 
estimate the effect. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 A look at the data and basic estimation results 
Most of our data is taken from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED). 
The dataset is monthly US time series from 1982:11 to 2000:12. The observed federal 
funds rate is the monthly average rate for all the models
6. For Models 2 and 3, we compute 
the output gap by quadratically detrending the log of real GDP interpolated
7 to monthly 
series. Annual inflation was calculated by interpolating the seasonally adjusted GDP 
deflator series (chained index in 1996 dollars) to a monthly frequency. These calculations 
make the computed Taylor’s rule consistent with Taylor’s original work. The monthly 
spread was calculated by taking the difference of the monthly average of 10-year Treasury 
note rate and the monthly average of 3-month T-bill rate. These data were also taken from 
FRED. 
The second and third models include a monetary policy rule based in part on 
inflationary expectations. We interpret this variable as being part of the Federal Reserve’s 
                                                                                                                                                     
5 We computed the rule with a zero percent inflation target as against Taylor’s 2 percent. 
6 Using monthly average data makes it easy to compare the results with the standard literature on monetary 
policy. Finally, the data on other variables were available only at monthly frequency.  We do not use the end 
of the month data because some of them are on ‘clearance Wednesdays’ and add extra noise to the data. 
7 All the interpolations have been computed using the cubic spline method and “interp1” command in 
MATLAB. 
  10forward looking data, so we want a measure that directly estimates expectations about 
future inflation. We measure inflationary expectations by taking the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF) data and interpolating to a monthly series. The SPF forecasts the GDP 
deflator, which is consistent with our measure of inflation. In addition, Croushore argues 
(Crueshore, 1998) that the SPF is the best of the available survey-based data. 
We treat the Federal Reserve’s desired funds rate as unobservable, but some data 
does exist on the Federal Reserve’s announced targets. We chose to treat the desired rate as 
unobservable for two reasons. First, as a matter of principle we prefer to let the data 
identify policymaker intentions rather than impose a priori that announced targets are real 
targets. Second, there are several significant data issues in using announced targets. The 
Fed has announced target rates only from the 1990s, although earlier target rates can be 
derived from the minutes of FOMC meetings. Further, target rates are generally set at six-
week intervals, which is an awkward match for the calendar month frequency usually used 
for monetary policy analysis. 
Whatever the advantages in principle of treating the desired rate as unobservable, it 
is nonetheless interesting to look at announced target data. We took data for the Federal 
Reserve’s announced targets from 1989:06 onwards from Haver Analytics while the earlier 
data is from the Economagic web site.
8Announced target rate data, along with the estimated 
desired rate from our first model, is plotted in Figure 3. As a practical matter announced 
targets and the estimated desired rate are essentially indistinguishable, including during the 
periods in the 1990s when the Fed held the announced target rate fixed.  
  11Our data runs from the end of monetary base targeting through the last available 
data, 1982:11-2000:12. The dating of the breakpoint is treated as known and certain, but the 
actual date chosen is at once somewhat arbitrary and not too important. We assume a 
known breakpoint at 1991:04 since the NBER announced trough of the 1990-91 depression 
was on 1991:03. After that date, the US economy did not experience any other recessions 
or significant inflationary periods during the data sample. This breakpoint also conveniently 
divides our sample roughly in half. Thus, “1980s” is the shorthand for 1982:11-1991:03 
and “1990s” is the shorthand for 1991:04-2000:12.  
Our results are – mostly – robust to the choice of breakpoint. Moving the breakpoint 
forward up to 24 months while re-estimating Model 1 produces log likelihood values that 
are not significantly different from the results based on 1991:04, and in fact are almost 
always lower. Similarly, moving the breakpoint backward up to 7 months gives no 
significant differences in the log likelihood. Moving the breakpoint earlier does sometimes 
give higher values of the log likelihood function, but the model for the “1980s” begins to 
break down as estimated transition probabilities go to the boundary of the parameter space. 
At the same time, the substantive conclusions are the same as from the use of our preferred 
breakpoint. For example, Hamilton and Jorda mention (Hamilton and Jorda, 2002) 1989:12 
as the starting point of the Fed’s shift in operating procedure. As a comparison we re-
estimated our results for Model 1, given in Table 4A, using 1989:12 as the breakpoint and 
present the results in Table 4B. The estimates of the model and the results are essentially 
the same as that of Table 4A except that the estimate of  p  in the 1980s hits the zero 
                                                                                                                                                     
8 The sites are http://www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/rba/fooirusfftrmx and 
http://www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/rba/fooirusfftrmn. Some of the months have a range between 
  12boundary. Note in particular that the standard deviation of the first difference of the federal 
funds rate in the 1980s is approximately 1.94 times that of the same estimate in the 1990s, 
differing inconsequentially from the 2.06 ratio using 1991:4 as the breakpoint. 
We begin the data analysis proper by conducting the standard unit root test on the 
federal funds rate. In Table 2, we provide the ADF-Statistic for the full sample and the two 
sub-samples. It is not possible to reject the presence of unit root at 10 percent level of 
significance in any of the samples, which suggests that the presence of unit root in the 
series is a possibility. In Table 3, we report the KPSS test results for the null of level 
stationarity. Results for the full sample show we can reject level stationarity at 5 percent 
level of significance. The KPSS test result for the first half sample is not significant. 
However, the second half sample rejects the null of level stationarity at the 5 percent level. 
Taken together, - this evidence does offer some support for the presence of a unit root in the 
funds rate series and provide the basis for including a non-stationary regime in the 
switching model. 
4.2 Estimation results and hypothesis testing in the unobserved desired rate model 
We present the estimation results for the unobserved desired rate model in Table 
4-A
9. Parameter estimates are given separately for the 1980s and 1990s. The standard 
deviation of the noise element,  ε σ , drops by about a third in the 1990s. The standard 
deviation of the shocks to the desired rate,  v σ , in the 1990s is less than half its 1980s value. 
                                                                                                                                                     
minimum and maximum intended rate and in those cases; the average of the two has been used as data.  
9 All the following estimations have been done using the approximate maximum likelihood method outlined 
in Kim and Nelson (Kim and Nelson, 1999). Calculations were done using the BFGS algorithm in GAUSS. 
 
  13Both parameters are tightly estimated. The estimates also show a rise in the persistence of 
the AR (1) shock, u .   t
The increased persistence increases the variance of u  while the drop in  t v σ  











 is a drop in the variance of the shock to the 
desired rate from 0.114 to 0.048. We used a nonlinear Wald test to check the hypothesis 
that the variance of ut remained same across the break point. A test statistic value of 4.42 
implies that the null hypothesis is rejected at 5 percent level of significance.  Finally p, the 
probability of remaining in the static regime, rose and q, the probability of remaining in the 








 increased from 10 percent to 49 percent. A Wald statistic of 7.45 against 
the null of an unchanged steady-state probability implies we can reject the null at the 1 
percent level of significance.  
The point estimates in Table 4–A indicate that there was a greatly increased 
tendency in the 1990s for the Fed to keep the desired federal funds rate fixed. Another way 
to look at this dramatic change is presented in Figure 2, which shows the smoothed 
probabilities of being in the static regime
10. High probabilities of the static regime 
occurrence are much more frequent after 1991:04 than before. The second Wald test in 
Table 4-A shows that the size of change in monthly average desired rate also dropped 
significantly. In fact, when in the dynamic state, the average size of change in monthly 
                                                 
10 The two-sided estimates of the filtered probability were computed using Kim’s smoothing algorithm 
outlined in Kim and Nelson (Kim and Nelson, 1999). 
  14desired rate has dropped from 34 basis points in the 1980s to 22 basis points in the 1990s.  
Estimated values of the desired rate are shown in Figure 3. In Table 5, we use the estimates 
of model 1 to decompose the decrease in the variance of the change in the funds rate into its 
various components. We first divide the reduction into two parts; the part due to reduction 
in the variance of the desired rate change and the part due to reduction in the variance of the 
white noise term. The variance of the change in the desired rate is the variance of u  
conditional on being in the dynamic state. The figures in Table 5 show that essentially all 
the change in the variance, 95 percent, can be attributed to reduction in the variance of 
changes in the desired rate. 
t
Since this component is the biggest portion of the fall in the variance, we further 
decompose it into three parts. (Details of the calculation are given in the Appendix.) The 
first part is the part due to reduction in the variance of u , keeping the steady-state 
probabilities of each state at the 1980s level. (The figures in Table 5 are given as a 
percentage of the reduction in the desired rate variance, so the denominator for the last 
three rows is the numerator from row two.) The second part is due to the change in steady-
state probabilities only, keeping the variance of change in the desired rate at the 1980’s 
level. The third part is the interaction term between the above two types of change. They 
account for 76 percent, 57 percent and –33 percent of the final change in the mean value of 
variance of change the desired rate respectively. 
t
  
4.3 Estimation results and hypothesis testing in the extended models 
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size of changes in the desired rate. Can less forceful reaction of the Fed to the changing 
economic pressures form an explanation to the phenomenon or is the lower volatilities of 
the economic pressures in the 1990s a better answer? The answer is a surprising ‘neither’. 
To examine, we add to the unobserved desired rate model a monetary policy rule with 
forward and backward looking components. Using the estimated monetary policy rule 
leaves the parameter estimates (in Table 6) of  q p,  and  ε σ  essentially unchanged from the 
previous model. In particular, we find that the steady-state probability of being in the static 
regime rose from 11.6 percent in the 1980s to 47 percent in the 1990s, the change being 
significant at the 5 percent level.  
Parameter estimates of the coefficients on inflation, inflationary expectations, and 
the spread indicate that the Fed reacted more aggressively in the 1990s than it had in the 
1980s. Point estimates of the coefficient of inflation and inflationary expectations went up 
by three times, the spread coefficient went from insignificantly negative to significantly 
positive. Only the point estimate of the coefficient of the output gap decreased, but 
insignificantly so. The increased response to inflation in the 1990s confirms the findings by 
Mankiw (Mankiw, 2002). 
Just how significant were these increases in estimates? Using a formal Wald test we 
can reject the joint null hypothesis that the four parameters remained the same across 
periods at the 5 percent level of significance
11, as a whole they became more aggressive. 
However, when we subdivide the four explanatory variables into forward-looking 
  16(inflationary expectation and spread) and backward-looking (inflation and output gap) 
variables and do Wald tests on each group separately, the test statistic value for the 
forward-looking variables was significant at 5 percent level but the test statistic value for 
backward-looking variables was not (though significant at 10 percent level). This suggests 
that even though there was a general rise in aggressiveness of Fed in the 1990s, it was more 
pronounced with respect to the forward-looking variables.  
How should this increase in forward-looking behavior be interpreted? We know that 
the 1990s was a more stable decade than the 1980s. Our results on increased forward-
looking behavior of the Fed in the 1990s is at least suggestive that this changed policy 
behavior contributed to the added stability. 
Having ruled out a less aggressive Fed as an explanation for smaller variance, we 
then ask how much of monetary policy (changes in desired rate) is a reaction to the 
explanatory variables?  A comparison of the variances of u  from model 1 and model 2 
helps us to identify how much of the variation in change of desired rate can be explained by 
the four explanatory variables. Only 20.6 percent of the variation in change of desired rate 
can be explained by these four variables in the first half sample whereas 59.4 percent can 
be explained in the second half. This suggests that the Fed is sticking closer to an interest 
rate rule-like behavior than before. 
t
In Table 7, we decompose the components of variation of the change in the desired 
rate into forward-looking and backward-looking parts and examine how that changed 
between the two decades. The variances of all explanatory variables are given and they 
                                                                                                                                                     
11 Rejection of the null hypothesis of four restrictions is primarily driven by change in the inflationary 
expectation and the spread coefficients. A similar result is also reported in Hamilton and Jorda (Hamilton and 
  17confirm Mankiw’s (Mankiw, 2002) results - the 1990s was indeed a more stable decade 
compared to 1980s
12. But, the total explained variation by the four explanatory variables 
was less in the 1980s when compared to that in the 1990s. This rules out smaller variations 
in fundamentals as a potential answer, the aggressiveness of the Fed clearly dominated the 
lower variations of the fundamentals in the 1990s. Comparing the share
13 of the forward-
looking variables, we observe that it has increased by 26 percent and has remained 
important over this time. The share of the backward-looking variables has decreased by 5 
percent to 40.9 percent. These numbers confirm the rising aggressiveness of the Fed has 
dominated the lower variation in the explanatory variables, especially with respect to the 
forward-looking variables. 
In Model 3, we substitute a computed Taylor’s rule target for the current period 
variables. Figure 3 shows the target rate computed by Taylor’s rule. In Table 8, we present 
the parameter estimates of Model 3. Since the change in the desired rate is affected one to 
one for a change in the computed target rate, the current changes in gap and inflation are 
incorporated in the desired rate though with the stipulated weights on them. Comparing 
Table 8 and Table 9, the LR statistic value of 13.89 implies the forward-looking variables 
are important even in the presence of current period indicators. From the Wald statistic we 
see a significant increase in the coefficients on expected inflation and the spread in the 
1990s suggesting a more forward-looking behavior. Coefficients estimates are not greatly 
different from those in Table 6, suggesting that the issue of proxying for current period 
                                                                                                                                                     
Jorda, 2002). 
12 See McConnell and Quiros (McConnell and Quiros, 2000) and Kim, Nelson and Piger (Kim et al., 2002) 
for a discussion on this issue.  
  18indicators is not of great importance. Overall, the forward-looking variables were important 
to Fed in the 1980s and became more important in the 1990s. 
5. Summary and conclusion 
To summarize, we have several strong results robust across all our models. We 
begin with the datum that there was a sharp decline in the variance of the change in the 
federal funds rate in the last decade. One, we find that this is due principally to a decrease 
in the variance of the desired rate. While the noise component of the actual funds rate 
declined, it was small to begin with. Two, the non-linear feature of no movement in the 
desired rate is much more important in the 1990s than before. There is a large increase in 
the steady-state probability of the Fed holding the desired rate constant, which accounts for 
a significant fraction of the decline in variation of the desired rate. Three, the lower 
variance was not due to a less aggressive monetary authority. In fact, empirical evidence 
suggests a more aggressive Fed in the 1990s. Four, the results also suggest a more forward-
looking Fed than before. Five, majority of the smaller variance comes from Fed sticking 
closer to an interest rate rule-like behavior. 
                                                                                                                                                     
13 The share of each type of variables was computed as a percentage of total explained variation by all four 
variables. 
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  22Table 1: Standard deviations of Changes in Federal Funds Rate 
Volatilities 1982:11-  2000:12  1982:11- 1991:03  1991:04 - 2000:12 
σ (∆ it) 0.255  0.331  0.165 
 
 
Table 2: Unit Root Test of Federal Funds Rate 
Sample  1982:11-2000:12 1982:11-1991:03 1991:04-2000:12  10%- value 
ADF-Stat  -0.917 (1)  -0.795 (1)  -0.068 (3)  -1.616 
Note: The numbers in the parentheses are the number of lags used in computing the test 
statistic. The lag selections were based on minimum AIC criterion using EVIEWS package. 
We did not allow for a constant and time trend in the regression. 
 
Table 3: Level Stationarity Test of Federal Funds Rate 
Sample  1982:11-2000:12 1982:11-1991:03 1991:04-2000:12  5%- value 
KPSS-Stat  0.793 (15)  0.269 (10)  0.493 (11)  0.463 
Note: The numbers in the parentheses are the number of lags used in computing the test 
statistic. They were selected by taking the square root of number of observations in that 
sample. 
 
  23Table 4-A: Estimation Results for the Unobserved Desired Rate Model 
Parameters “1980s”  “1990s” 
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed using the delta method. 
 
 
Table 4-B: Estimation Results for the Unobserved Desired Rate Model Using Earlier 
Breakpoint 
Parameters “1980s”  “1990s” 
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed using the delta method. 
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Table 6: Estimation Results for the Model with 4 Fundamental Pressures 
 
Parameters “1980s”  “1990s” 
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed using the delta method. 
 
  26Table 7: Variance Decompositions in 1980s and 1990s 
Categories 1980s  1990s 
Change in V   ) (u 0.0235 0.0249 
) ( 1 1 1 1 − − − − ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ t R t x
e
t t R x V e φ φ π φ π φ
π π 0.0192 0.0301 
) ( 1 − ∆ t V π   0.0111 0.0048 
) ( 1
e
t V − ∆π   0.0169 0.0032 
) ( 1 − ∆ t x V   0.0557 0.0272 
) ( 1 − ∆ t R V   0.0969 0.0406 
Share of  1 − ∆ t π and    1 − ∆ t x 45.48% 40.86% 
Share of   and   
e
t 1 − ∆π 1 − ∆ t R 29.39% 55.67% 
Note: The terms V  denote variances of the variable concerned. The first row is the 
change in V  from model 1 to model 2. There are some minor rounding-off errors. 
(.)
) (u
  27 Table 8: Estimation Results for the Model with Taylor’s Rule and Forward-Looking 
Variables. 
 
Parameters “1980s”  “1990s” 
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed using the delta method. 
 
Table 9: Estimation Results for the Model with Taylor’s Rule Only 
Parameters “1980s”  “1990s” 
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed using the delta method. 
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  31Appendix: 
Derivations for Table 5 
t t t i i ε + =
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Therefore, since  t ε  is serially uncorrelated and independent of i , we have 
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Decomposing the desired rate section further: 
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Further Appendix (Not for Publication): 
Section A1: Diagnostic checks and other variables 
The standardized forecast errors from Model 1 are serially uncorrelated (refer to Table A1-
A). The estimates of  t ε  from Model 1 are also serially uncorrelated as specified (refer to 
Table A1-B and Figure A1-B). To determine the lag structure of the serially correlated 
shock in Model 1, we tried AR (2) specification and ARMA (1,1) specification. The gains 
in log likelihood values over AR (1) specification were insignificant in both cases. Figure 
A1-A shows the estimates of u .  t
 
Table A1-A: The Autocorrelation Structure of the Standardized Forecast Errors  
Lags  Autocorrelation  Partial AC  Q - Statistics  P-Value 
1 0.002  0.002  0.0005  0.981 
2 -0.008  -0.008  0.0135  0.993 
3 -0.011  -0.011  0.0385  0.998 
4 -0.077  -0.077  1.3672  0.850 
5 0.093  0.093  3.3031  0.653 
6 0.016  0.014  3.3612  0.762 
7 -0.064  -0.065  4.2957  0.745 
8 -0.028  -0.032  4.4754  0.812 
9 0.024  0.040  4.6088  0.867 
10 0.005  -0.003  4.6143  0.915 
11 0.027  0.013  4.7803  0.941 
12 0.011  0.019  4.8065  0.964 
 
  33Table A1-B: The Autocorrelation Structure of the Estimated Noise Term 
Lags  Autocorrelation  Partial AC  Q - Statistics  P-Value 
1 0.007  0.007  0.0106  0.918 
2 0.025  0.025  0.1543  0.926 
3 -0.019  -0.019  0.2348  0.972 
4 0.003  0.003  0.2368  0.994 
5 -0.012  -0.011  0.2698  0.998 
6 0.146  0.145  5.0665  0.535 
7 -0.024  -0.026  5.1960  0.636 
8 0.019  0.013  5.2823  0.727 
9 -0.021  -0.016  5.3865  0.799 
10 -0.032  -0.034  5.6212  0.846 
11 -0.106  -0.103  8.2324  0.692 
12 0.091  0.075  10.169  0.601 
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  35Section A2: Estimates of Model 2 
In Table A2-A, we present the estimation results of Model 2 with a different measure of 
inflation. The inflation rate is calculated from the interpolated GDP deflator, as used in 
computing Taylor’s rule. The estimates and the results are essentially same as that of Table 
6. 
 
Table A2-A: Estimation Results for the Model with 4 Fundamental Pressures 
 
Parameters “1980s”  “1990s” 
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed using the delta method. 
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